feat: 加固标题抓取并加上限流与可选入站令牌

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2026-10-09 15:51:50 +08:00
parent bf56c2bd46
commit f091fe691d
9 changed files with 710 additions and 11 deletions
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/**
* SSRF 防护:校验「服务端主动抓取」的目标地址是否安全。
*
* 背景:`/fetch-title` 由服务端抓取调用方给的 URL。如果不做限制,调用方可以拿它探测
* 内网服务与云元数据地址(169.254.169.254),把本服务当成内网跳板。
*
* 防护分四层,缺一层都能绕过:
* 1. 协议只允许 http/https;
* 2. 端口只允许 http/https 默认端口(外加显式配置的额外端口),避免被用来探测 Redis/MySQL 等内网服务;
* 3. 解析域名后校验**每一个**解析结果,而不是只校验字面量(防 DNS 解析到内网、防 DNS rebinding);
* 4. 重定向逐跳校验,避免「首跳合法、次跳内网」。
*/
import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises";
/** 允许的协议 */
const ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
/** 默认允许的端口 */
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PORTS = new Set(["80", "443"]);
/** 响应体读取上限(字节):标题通常在头部,不必读完整个页面 */
export const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 512 * 1024;
/** 最大重定向跳数 */
export const MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
export class UnsafeUrlError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "UnsafeUrlError";
}
}
/** 解析额外允许的端口:环境变量 LPT_AI_FETCH_ALLOWED_PORTS,逗号分隔 */
function allowedPorts(): Set<string> {
const extra = (process.env.LPT_AI_FETCH_ALLOWED_PORTS ?? "")
.split(",")
.map((p) => p.trim())
.filter((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p));
return new Set([...DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PORTS, ...extra]);
}
/**
* 判断一个 IP 字面量是否属于「不可主动访问」的地址段。
*
* 覆盖 IPv4 私网/回环/链路本地(含云元数据 169.254.169.254)/CGNAT/组播/保留段,
* 以及 IPv6 回环、未指定、ULA、链路本地、组播,并识别 IPv4-mapped 与 NAT64 里内嵌的 IPv4。
*/
export function isBlockedAddress(address: string): boolean {
const ip = address.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!ip) return true;
// IPv6:去掉可能的 zone id(fe80::1%eth0)
const bare = ip.includes("%") ? ip.slice(0, ip.indexOf("%")) : ip;
if (bare.includes(":")) {
return isBlockedIpv6(bare);
}
return isBlockedIpv4(bare);
}
function isBlockedIpv4(ip: string): boolean {
const parts = ip.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return true; // 不是合法 IPv4,按不安全处理
const octets = parts.map((p) => Number(p));
if (octets.some((n) => !Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return true;
const [a, b] = octets;
if (a === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8
if (a === 10) return true; // 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 127) return true; // 回环
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // 链路本地,含云元数据
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 192 && b === 0) return true; // 192.0.0.0/24 与 192.0.2.0/24
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10
if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) return true; // 基准测试 198.18.0.0/15
if (a === 198 && b === 51) return true; // TEST-NET-2
if (a === 203 && b === 0) return true; // TEST-NET-3
if (a >= 224) return true; // 组播与保留段
return false;
}
function isBlockedIpv6(ip: string): boolean {
// IPv4-mapped:::ffff:127.0.0.1 / ::ffff:7f00:1
const mapped = ip.match(/^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
if (mapped) return isBlockedIpv4(mapped[1]);
const groups = expandIpv6(ip);
if (!groups) return true; // 无法解析,按不安全处理
const first = groups[0];
if (groups.every((g) => g === 0)) return true; // :: 未指定
if (groups.slice(0, 7).every((g) => g === 0) && groups[7] === 1) return true; // ::1 回环
if ((first & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00) return true; // fc00::/7 ULA
if ((first & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80) return true; // fe80::/10 链路本地
if ((first & 0xff00) === 0xff00) return true; // ff00::/8 组播
// NAT64 64:ff9b::/96:内嵌 IPv4,取最后两组
if (groups[0] === 0x0064 && groups[1] === 0xff9b) {
const embedded = [groups[6] >> 8, groups[6] & 0xff, groups[7] >> 8, groups[7] & 0xff].join(".");
return isBlockedIpv4(embedded);
}
return false;
}
/** 把 IPv6 文本展开成 8 组 16 位整数;无法解析返回 null */
function expandIpv6(ip: string): number[] | null {
let text = ip;
// 内嵌 IPv4(如 ::ffff:1.2.3.4)先转成两组十六进制
const embedded = text.match(/^(.*:)(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
if (embedded) {
const octets = embedded[2].split(".").map((p) => Number(p));
if (octets.some((n) => !Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;
const high = ((octets[0] << 8) | octets[1]).toString(16);
const low = ((octets[2] << 8) | octets[3]).toString(16);
text = `${embedded[1]}${high}:${low}`;
}
const halves = text.split("::");
if (halves.length > 2) return null;
const parseGroups = (part: string): number[] | null => {
if (!part) return [];
const items = part.split(":");
const result: number[] = [];
for (const item of items) {
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(item)) return null;
result.push(parseInt(item, 16));
}
return result;
};
const head = parseGroups(halves[0]);
const tail = halves.length === 2 ? parseGroups(halves[1]) : [];
if (head === null || tail === null) return null;
if (halves.length === 1) {
return head.length === 8 ? head : null;
}
const fill = 8 - head.length - tail.length;
if (fill < 0) return null;
return [...head, ...new Array(fill).fill(0), ...tail];
}
/**
* 校验目标 URL 是否可以安全抓取。不通过时抛 {@link UnsafeUrlError}。
*
* @param rawUrl 调用方给的 URL
*/
export async function assertSafeUrl(rawUrl: string): Promise<URL> {
let url: URL;
try {
url = new URL(rawUrl);
} catch {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("无效的 URL");
}
if (!ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.has(url.protocol)) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("只支持抓取 http/https 链接");
}
const port = url.port || (url.protocol === "https:" ? "443" : "80");
if (!allowedPorts().has(port)) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("这个链接的端口不在允许范围内");
}
// 字面量就是 IP 时直接判定,避免走了 DNS 分支
const host = url.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
if (isIpLiteral(host)) {
if (isBlockedAddress(host)) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("不能抓取内网或本机地址");
}
return url;
}
// 域名:解析后逐个校验,防止解析到内网或 DNS rebinding
let addresses: string[];
try {
const resolved = await lookup(host, { all: true });
addresses = resolved.map((item) => item.address);
} catch {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("无法解析这个链接的域名");
}
if (addresses.length === 0) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("无法解析这个链接的域名");
}
if (addresses.some((address) => isBlockedAddress(address))) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("不能抓取内网或本机地址");
}
return url;
}
function isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {
if (/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/.test(host)) return true;
return host.includes(":");
}
export interface SafeFetchResult {
/** 最终跳转到的地址 */
finalUrl: string;
/** 响应体(截断到上限) */
body: string;
}
/**
* 带上限与逐跳校验的抓取。
*
* @param rawUrl 目标地址
* @param timeoutMs 单次请求超时
*/
export async function safeFetchText(rawUrl: string, timeoutMs = 10_000): Promise<SafeFetchResult> {
let current = await assertSafeUrl(rawUrl);
for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
const controller = new AbortController();
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
try {
const response = await fetch(current, {
signal: controller.signal,
// 自己处理重定向,才能逐跳校验
redirect: "manual",
headers: { accept: "text/html,application/xhtml+xml" },
});
if (isRedirect(response.status)) {
const location = response.headers.get("location");
if (!location) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("重定向没有给出目标地址");
}
// 相对跳转按当前地址解析,然后重新走一遍完整校验
current = await assertSafeUrl(new URL(location, current).toString());
continue;
}
if (!response.ok) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("目标地址没有正常返回内容");
}
const body = await readCapped(response);
return { finalUrl: current.toString(), body };
} finally {
clearTimeout(timer);
}
}
throw new UnsafeUrlError("跳转次数过多,已停止抓取");
}
function isRedirect(status: number): boolean {
return status === 301 || status === 302 || status === 303 || status === 307 || status === 308;
}
/**
* 读取响应体并截断:既防超大响应打爆内存,也避免为一个标题读完整个页面。
*/
async function readCapped(response: Response): Promise<string> {
const contentType = response.headers.get("content-type") ?? "";
if (contentType && !/text\/|xml|json/i.test(contentType)) {
throw new UnsafeUrlError("这个链接不是网页内容");
}
const body = response.body;
if (!body) return "";
const reader = body.getReader();
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
let total = 0;
try {
for (;;) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
if (!value) continue;
chunks.push(value);
total += value.byteLength;
if (total >= MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) break;
}
} finally {
await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
}
const buffer = Buffer.concat(chunks.map((chunk) => Buffer.from(chunk)));
const text = buffer.subarray(0, MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES).toString("utf-8");
return text;
}