Files
pi-commandcode-provider/.semgrep/pi-extension-audit.yaml
T

271 lines
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YAML

rules:
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Exfiltration: sending secrets to remote servers
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-data-exfiltration-fetch
patterns:
- pattern: fetch($URL, ...)
message: >
Data exfiltration risk: sending data to $URL via fetch.
Verify the destination is not an attacker-controlled server.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
focus-metavariable: $URL
- id: pi-extension-data-exfiltration-xmlhttprequest
pattern: new XMLHttpRequest()
message: >
Suspicious XMLHttpRequest usage in provider code.
Could exfiltrate data to external servers.
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Secret leakage: logging / sending API keys
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-logging-secrets
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: console.log(...)
- pattern: console.error(...)
- pattern: console.warn(...)
- pattern-regex: "api[kK]ey|API_KEY|COMMANDCODE|Bearer|authPath"
message: >
Potential secret logging: log statement includes an API key, auth token,
or auth file path pattern. Do not log secrets.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
- id: pi-extension-secret-in-error-message
patterns:
- pattern: Error($MSG)
- pattern-regex: "api[kK]ey|API_KEY|COMMANDCODE|Bearer"
message: >
Possible secret leak in error message: $MSG.
Error messages surfaced to pi may leak credentials.
Use generic messages instead.
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# URL hijacking: changing API base endpoints
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-api-base-override
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: $VAR = "..."
- pattern: $VAR = process.env.$ENV_VAR ?? "..."
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $VAR
regex: "(?i).*(api_?base|api_base_url|base_url|host|endpoint|models_url).*"
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $ENV_VAR
regex: "(?i).*API.*BASE.*"
message: >
API base URL override: $ENV_VAR can redirect all requests including auth
headers to any server. Review any change to how this variable is set.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Supply chain: dependency injection
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-untrusted-dynamic-require
patterns:
- pattern: require($MODULE)
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $MODULE
regex: "^(?!['\"](\\.[/\\\\]|node:?|@earendil-works/))['\"]"
message: >
Dynamic require() of non-local, non-standard-library module: $MODULE.
External contributors could introduce malicious packages this way.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
- id: pi-extension-postinstall-script
patterns:
- pattern: '"postinstall": "$SCRIPT"'
message: >
postinstall script detected: $SCRIPT. Install-time scripts can execute
arbitrary code on user machines. Must be reviewed with extreme care.
severity: ERROR
languages: [json]
paths:
include:
- "package.json"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# File system: reading auth files / ~/.pi
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-auth-path-traversal
patterns:
- pattern: join($HOME, $PATH)
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $HOME
regex: "homedir|homeDir|HOME|process\\.env\\.HOME"
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $PATH
regex: "['\"].*\\.\\./.*['\"]"
message: >
Auth path traversal: $HOME / $PATH could read outside the intended auth
directory. Path must stay within ~/.commandcode, ~/.pi/agent, ~/.omp/agent.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- id: pi-extension-readfile-sensitive-paths
patterns:
- pattern: readFileSync($PATH, ...)
- pattern-not: readFileSync($PATH, "utf-8")
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $PATH
regex: "(auth\\.json|credentials|\\.env|id_rsa|ssh|\\.netrc|netrc|\\.npmrc)"
message: >
Suspicious file read: $PATH. Auth files or credentials being read with
potentially unsafe encoding. Review carefully.
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Network: unexpected fetch calls
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-unexpected-fetch
pattern: fetch(...)
message: >
Direct fetch() call detected. Provider code should use injected
fetchImpl for testability and security. If this is intentional,
add a // nosemgrep comment on the line above.
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Shell execution
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-shell-execution
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: child_process.exec(...)
- pattern: child_process.execSync(...)
- pattern: child_process.spawn(...)
- pattern: child_process.spawnSync(...)
- pattern: child_process.fork(...)
- pattern: exec($SCRIPT)
- pattern: execSync($SCRIPT)
message: >
Shell execution: $SCRIPT. External contributors should not add
child_process calls to provider source code.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Malicious import patterns
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-unusual-import
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: 'import $X from "..."'
- pattern: 'const $X = require("...")'
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $X
regex: "(compression|pako|zlib|tar|stream|archiver|request|axios|needle|got|superagent|node-fetch|undici)"
message: >
Suspicious import of $X in provider source. Network or compression
libraries could be used for data exfiltration.
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
- id: pi-extension-eval-like
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: eval(...)
- pattern: new Function(...)
- pattern: setTimeout($X, ...)
- pattern: setInterval($X, ...)
- pattern-not: setTimeout(() => ..., ...)
- pattern-not: setTimeout(function(...) {...}, ...)
- pattern-not: setTimeout(function $F(...) {...}, ...)
- pattern-not: setInterval(() => ..., ...)
- pattern-not: setInterval(function(...) {...}, ...)
- pattern-not: setInterval(function $F(...) {...}, ...)
message: >
Code injection risk: eval, Function constructor, or eval-like setTimeout
detected. These can execute arbitrary code.
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Process environment: reading secrets
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: pi-extension-env-leak
patterns:
- pattern: process.env.$VAR
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $VAR
regex: "(?!COMMANDCODE_|COMMAND_CODE_|CMD_ZDR|NODE_|PATH|HOME|SHELL|USER|LANG|LC_|TERM|TMPDIR|NIX_).*"
message: >
Reading unexpected environment variable $VAR. Provider should only
read documented Command Code or standard runtime variables.
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
paths:
include:
- "**/*.ts"
- "**/index.ts"
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# OAuth flow manipulation
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────